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Case Note 
NATURAL JUSTICE: A CASE FOR UNIFORM RIGOUR 
Ho Paul v Singapore Medical Council 
[2008] 2 SLR 780 
Kay Swee Pin v Singapore Island Country Club 
[2008] 2 SLR 802 
This note considers if there is a discernible framework in 
which courts resolve alleged claims of breaches of natural 
justice. On the one hand, once it has been ascertained that 
the rules of natural justice apply, the court will look at all the 
circumstances of the case to determine if there has been any 
unfairness. On the other hand, it has been suggested that 
even assuming the rules of natural justice apply, there can be 
varying degrees of rigour in which they are enforced, a 
sliding scale of sorts. 
CHEN Siyuan 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore); 
Justices’ Law Clerk & Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court of Singapore 
Lionel LEO 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore); 
Justices’ Law Clerk & Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court of Singapore 
I. Introduction 
1 Natural justice is often described as a concept that is “highly 
flexible” and dependent on the facts of each case.1 Indeed, what 
constitutes a fair hearing presided by an impartial tribunal – said to be 
the “irreducible core” of natural justice2 – does not lend itself to an 
endeavour of preconceiving all the factual permutations. However, the 
authors of this note would suggest that on the jurisprudence presented, 
                                                                       
1 See Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore, vol 1 (Butterworths Asia, 1999) at p 48; Woolf, 
Jowell & Le Sueur, De Smith, Woolf & Jowell’s Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 1995) at p 431; Aronson & Dyer, 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Sydney: LBC, 2nd Ed, 2000) at p 395; and 
Kok Seng Chong v Bukit Turf Club [1993] 2 SLR 388 at [48] ; and Wade & Forsyth, 
Administrative Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 9th Ed, 2004) at p 496. 
2 Re Shankar Alan [2007] 1 SLR 85 at [42]. 
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the methodology or analytical framework in which courts resolve 
alleged breaches of natural justice might be said to be broken down into 
two parts (let us call this our suggested approach): (a) first, the 
threshold question of whether the rules of natural justice should even 
apply to a given situation must be satisfied. In that connection, the 
House of Lords decision in Ridge v Baldwin has identified four 
categorical situations, which are based on the type of rights that are at 
stake;3 (b) the court would next consider the entire factual matrix of the 
case and determine if any well-established tenets of fairness (ie, first 
principles) have been breached (eg, the rule against pre-judgment of 
guilt). Where necessary, the court refers to more specific categorical 
precedents (eg, whether there is a right to cross-examination). That said, 
there exists a somewhat countervailing view that the rules of natural 
justice should be applied with more rigour in certain contexts, and less 
so in others. This notion seems self-contradictory, and (as shall be 
demonstrated) is superfluous in view of the threshold question Ridge v 
Baldwin presents. This note, therefore, considers two recent cases 
whereby the foregoing contrasting viewpoints are examined. 
2 The first, Ho Paul v Singapore Medical Council (“Ho Paul”),4 
involved issues of expanding the role of a tribunal when a doctor facing 
disciplinary sanctions did not avail himself of counsel. The second, Kay 
Swee Pin v Singapore Island Country Club (“Kay Swee Pin”),5 involved 
reviewing the suspension of a member from a premier country club, of 
which the impartiality of the disciplinary process therein was alleged to 
be tainted by club politics. In both cases, much was at stake: the 
livelihood of a professional, and the suspension of an expensively-
acquired membership. The applicability of the rules of natural justice in 
either instance was thus not in issue. But when these two cases are 
examined in juxtaposition, we are left to ask if they have posited 
reconcilable approaches in resolving questions of natural justice. 
Specifically, Kay Swee Pin endorses the (by no means unprecedented) 
view that natural justice can be enforced more (or less) rigorously in 
certain situations. On the other hand, Ho Paul, while a decision of 
considerable brevity, is seemingly more compatible with the suggested 
approach. 
                                                                       
3 [1964] AC 40 at 65–72 per Lord Reid. The categories are where there is a: (a) 
master-servant relationship; (b) deprivation of property rights and privileges; (c) 
deprivation of membership of a body; and (d) disciplinary proceeding. On the last 
category, see also Chiam See Tong v Singapore Democratic Party [1994] 1 SLR 278; 
Joseph Clement v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2002] 4 SLR 794. It should be said that 
Ridge v Baldwin was an important decision in many other respects that are beyond 
the scope of this note. 
4 [2008] 2 SLR 780. 
5 [2008] 2 SLR 802. This entire saga was also widely reported in the local press, from 
January to June 2008 in The Straits Times. 
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II. Ho Paul 
3 Dr Ho had been found guilty of professional misconduct by the 
Singapore Medical Council and he was censured, fined $1,000 and 
suspended for three months.6 He chose to appear in person before the 
Council’s Disciplinary Committee (“DC”) and conducted his own 
defence. One of the questions raised on appeal was whether natural 
justice was breached because: (a) Dr Ho had declined to cross-examine 
the Council’s key witness (“Dr Tan”) but the DC failed to warn Dr Ho 
of the “legal implications” of this; and (b) the DC had failed to ensure 
that Dr Ho appreciated the importance of making a mitigation plea.7 
The court’s reply, encapsulated in [13] of its judgment, reflected a 
consideration of both first principles and the surrounding facts of the 
case: 
Additional duties are not foisted on a tribunal merely because the 
individual is unrepresented – advising a person who has been charged 
of his litigation strategies and options is the duty of an advocate and 
solicitor, not the adjudicator. This is quite apart from the general 
premise that tribunals are masters of their own procedures. Where 
breaches of the rules of natural justice are alleged, the key question lies 
in asking whether the individual concerned was given the opportunity 
to present his case and whether he suffered any prejudice as a result of 
any unfairness in the conduct of the proceedings … Dr Ho had been 
given the opportunity to present his case and cross-examine the 
witnesses, and had also been invited to make a mitigation plea. There 
was simply no basis to suggest that fairness had been compromised. 
4 In effect, Dr Ho had argued that he was entitled to a higher 
standard of natural justice because he was not legally represented. Let us 
attempt to expound on the court’s reasoning as to why it rejected this 
argument. 
A. The legal implications of failing to cross-examine 
5 To be sure, the issue is not whether doctors have a right to legal 
representation before the DC. Notwithstanding s 43(3) of the Medical 
Registration Act8 (“[t]he registered medical practitioner may appear in 
person or be represented by counsel”), there is sufficient case law to 
suggest that Dr Ho was entitled to argue that he had a right to counsel.9 
Yet, the question as to whether the DC’s failure to warn him of the “legal 
implications” of not cross-examining Dr Tan amounted to a procedural 
                                                                       
6 [2008] 2 SLR 780 at [1]. 
7 [2008] 2 SLR 780 at [12]. 
8 (Cap 174, 2004 Rev Ed) 
9 Eg, R v Board of Visitors of HM Prison [1988] 1 AC 379; Kok Seng Chong v Bukit 
Turf Club [1993] 2 SLR 388 at [56]. 
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irregularity is very much linked to the underlying principles of the right 
to counsel. As has been written: “often a party cannot effectively exercise 
his right to cross-examination unless he is represented by a lawyer”10 – 
the corollary then, is that extending the right of cross-examination to an 
unrepresented party may not suffice. Lord Denning’s remarks in Pett v 
Greyhound Racing Association Ltd are equally apposite: 
It is not every man who has the ability to defend himself on his own. 
He cannot bring out the points in his own favour or the weaknesses in 
the other side. He may be tongue-tied or nervous, confused or wanting 
in intelligence. He cannot examine or cross-examine witnesses. We see 
it every day. A magistrate says to a man: “You can ask any questions 
you like”; whereupon the man immediately starts to make a speech.11 
6 Likewise, it was stated in Bushell v Secretary of State for the 
Environment that “there is a massive body of accepted decisions 
establishing that natural justice requires that a party be given an 
opportunity of challenging by cross-examination witnesses called by 
other parties on relevant issues”.12 It therefore stands to reason that a 
proper hearing includes a fair opportunity for the individual to correct 
anything prejudicial to his view, especially if the opposing party has had 
the opportunity of cross-examination.13 Conversely, from a more 
pragmatic standpoint, it can be said that the true question in every case 
is whether the absence of cross-examination renders the decision unfair 
in all the circumstances.14 This might explain in part why the court in 
Ho Paul emphasised that they detected no prejudice suffered by the 
appellant. Of course, one notices that first, Dr Ho chose, entirely of his 
own volition, not to avail himself of legal representation. Secondly, the 
DC did give Dr Ho the opportunity to present his case and cross-
examine the witnesses. A legal assessor – “an advocate and solicitor of 
not less than 10 years standing” – would also have been present during 
the inquiry,15 and he would have helped ensure a fair hearing. It is 
noteworthy that per s 43(4) (see also s 43(1)) of the Medical 
Registration Act, the DC was not bound by any written laws relating to 
evidence. This supports the notion that tribunals, regardless of form, are 
always masters of their own procedure, and they possess the discretion 
                                                                       
10 Woolf, Jowell and & Le Sueur, De Smith, Woolf & Jowell’s Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 1995) at p 456. 
11 [1969] 1 QB 125 at 132. 
12 [1981] AC 75 at 116. 
13 Woolf, Jowell and & Le Sueur, De Smith, Woolf & Jowell’s Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 1995) at p 512; Craig, 
Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 2003) at p 434. 
14 Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75 at 108; Woolf, Jowell 
and & Le Sueur, De Smith, Woolf & Jowell’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 1995) at pp 455–456. 
15 See s 61 of the Medical Registration Act (Cap 174, 2004 Rev Ed). 
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as to whether certain privileges should be extended.16 It is not being 
suggested, however, that s 43(4) reflects a legislative intent to 
circumscribe a fair hearing; rather, the argument that the DC had a duty 
to warn Dr Ho is also, at bottom, predicated on the presupposition that 
Dr Ho had an absolute right to cross-examination. Such a 
presupposition does not comport with the preponderance of local and 
English authorities.17 By most accepted accounts, there is tremendous 
value in cross-examination (it being a cornerstone of litigation),18 but it 
is one thing to say that Dr Ho was deprived of his right to cross-
examination, and an even bolder thing to say that he should have been 
warned of the legal consequences of not proceeding with cross-
examination. 
7 Then there is the imperative question of the roles and functions 
of a tribunal, which is probably the logically prior question. For these 
purposes, a useful analogy – and an example of the universal 
applicability of first principles – is found in Rajeevan Edakalavan v PP.19 
There, the accused had appeared in person before the Magistrate and 
entered a plea of guilt. However, he then petitioned for criminal 
revision, arguing that as the Magistrate had not informed him of the 
defences available to him, his plea was equivocal. The court refuted this 
argument in the strongest terms at [22]:20 
It is not the duty of the judge to inform the accused of the defences or 
other options that may be open to him and advantageous to his case. 
That is the duty of the counsel … The onus does not shift to the judge 
(or the prosecution, for that matter) simply because the accused is 
unrepresented. That will be placing too onerous a burden on the 
judge. Furthermore, the judge will be performing two completely 
incompatible and irreconcilable roles – one as the adjudicator, the 
other as the de facto defence counsel. [emphasis added] 
8 It would seem that the principles espoused above can be easily 
imported into the administrative law context. It is important to 
remember that cross-examination is a tool in the adversarial process, 
and a tool of the advocate. Failing to utilise it likely results in a strategic 
disadvantage, but to assert it results invariably in “legal implications” 
unfavourable to the individual stretches the argument. It would have 
                                                                       
16 See Woolf, Jowell and & Le Sueur, De Smith, Woolf & Jowell’s Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 1995) at pp 454–455. 
17 Woolf, Jowell and & Le Sueur, De Smith, Woolf & Jowell’s Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 1995); Kok Seng Chong v 
Bukit Turf Club [1993] 2 SLR 388 at [56]. 
18 Eg, Mechanical & General Inventions Co v Austin (1935) AC 346 at 359; cf, Aronson 
& Dyer, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Sydney: LBC, 2nd Ed, 2000) at 
p 438. 
19 [1998] 1 SLR 815. 
20 See also Soong Hee Sin v PP [2001] 2 SLR 253 at [8]. 
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been unreasonable and improper for the DC to have adopted both the 
role of counsel and adjudicator as this would have resulted in both a 
conflict of interest and a conflation of roles. 
B. Appreciating the importance of making a mitigation plea 
9 While not many will quarrel with the notion that mitigation 
(which is not an absolute right)21 can positively affect the outcome of a 
case,22 the aforementioned principles on the role of an adjudicator apply 
just as well to the second alleged breach of natural justice. It cannot be 
the duty of an adjudicator to inform an individual of options that will 
assist that individual’s case, even if it is for the purpose of asking for a 
lighter sentence. Indeed, the court in Ng Ai Tiong v PP, which dealt with 
the even more fundamental question of whether the court should have 
invited the accused to make such a plea, stated: 
What the applicant was seeking to suggest in asking this question was 
effectively that, before passing a sentence a court is duty bound to 
invite the convicted person to present his mitigating plea. Such a 
contention must be strenuously rejected. In any case being heard before 
the court, it is the defence counsel who has a duty to defend the accused, 
his client. The court has no duty to defend the accused and neither is it 
obliged to assist the accused in presenting his case.23 [emphasis added] 
10 A fortiori, how can the argument that a DC is expected to ensure 
the individual appreciates the importance of making such a plea be 
sustained? The correctness of the outcome of Ho Paul, in relation to 
natural justice, is further supported by three key facts: (a) the DC did 
invite Dr Ho to make a mitigation plea;24 (b) the court sieved the 
relevant evidence and concluded that no prejudice or unfairness was 
suffered by Dr Ho (coupled with the finding that he was allowed to 
present his case to the DC);25 and (c) the DC had, prior to determining 
the sanctions for Dr Ho, considered his unblemished record of 
26 years.26 In bridging to the next case to be discussed, the court’s modus 
operandi in Ho Paul seems to be that it had considered the existing scope 
of natural justice by focusing on either established first principles (eg, 
the disparate functions of adjudicator and counsel) or established 
categories of natural justice (eg, the situations in which a right to cross-
examination arises, and why). This was coupled with a close scrutiny of 
                                                                       
21 See Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur, De Smith, Woolf & Jowell’s Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 1995) at p 456. 
22 Eg, PP v Lee Meng Soon [2007] 4 SLR 240 at [30]. 
23 [2000] 2 SLR 358 at [16]. 
24 Ho Paul [2008] 2 SLR 780 at [13]. 
25 Ho Paul [2008] 2 SLR 780. 
26 Ho Paul [2008] 2 SLR 780 at [6]. While it is unfair to hypothesise what Dr Ho 
would have pleaded in mitigation, it is plain that the DC did take on board a fact 
that would have been crucial had mitigation been pleaded. 
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the entire factual matrix, wherein the court was reinforced in its view 
that Dr Ho had been given a fair hearing. In other words, Ho Paul can be 
justified on both the legal reasoning and facts. Indeed, although Dr Ho 
was in a precarious situation (facing suspension and not legally 
represented), there was no express or implied allusion to rules of natural 
justice needing to be enforced more or less rigorously. However, Kay 
Swee Pin proffers a different perspective. 
III. Kay Swee Pin 
11 As will soon be evident, the facts of this case ought to be 
narrated in some detail. The appellant (“Kay”) became a member of the 
respondent club (“SICC”) in 1992 after paying a fee of $190,000. In her 
application form, she declared one Ng as her spouse. She was not asked 
to produce her marriage certificate, and neither was she told what 
constituted a “spouse”. As it were, Kay and Ng had been living together 
since 1982 and married in January that year by way of a customary 
marriage in Johor; they even had an 18-year-old daughter. The 
complication, however, was that between 1977 and December 1982, Kay 
was married to someone else (“Koh”); ie, when the customary marriage 
took place, Kay’s first marriage had not yet to been dissolved. 
12 In August 2005 – 13 years after she had joined SICC–Kay 
decided to stand for elections as Captain of the Lady Golfers’ Sub-
Committee. Simultaneously, there were rumours concerning whether 
Ng was truly her husband, and since SICC was in the midst of updating 
its members’ bio-data, it asked Kay for a copy of her marriage certificate. 
It was furnished the next month, but the certificate showed that she had 
married Ng only on 24 August 2005 in Las Vegas. Lee, the husband of 
Kay’s rival in the elections, e-mailed SICC’s general manager in 
September 2005, urging SICC to investigate Kay’s marital status. On 
election day, the general manager informed Kay that Lee had made a 
complaint against her, and warned her against running in the elections. 
Kay went ahead and lost. 
13 On 10 October 2005, SICC’s General Committee (“GC”) met to 
discuss Kay’s marital status. There, some members opined that Kay had 
declared Ng as her spouse so that he could use SICC’s facilities.27 Along 
the way, SICC searched the Registry of Marriages and discovered that 
Kay was married to Koh at the material time (ie, 1982). On 
18 November, Kay received a notification to appear before the 
Disciplinary Committee (“DC”). She was charged with, inter alia, falsely 
declaring Ng as her spouse.28 Before the DC hearing, Kay provided a 
                                                                       
27 Kay Swee Pin [2008] 2 SLR 802 at [16]. 
28 Kay Swee Pin [2008] 2 SLR 802 at [18]. 
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couple of written responses, explaining the circumstances surrounding 
the marriage certificate. The DC hearing took place on 11 February 
2006 in the absence of Kay as proceedings had already been postponed 
several times,29 but her written responses were considered together with 
the oral evidence of Lee and SICC’s administrative manager. Before 
adjourning, the DC established that the issue was whether Kay was 
divorced when she joined SICC. On 16 February, the GC requested Kay 
to furnish documents vis-à-vis the dissolution of her marriage to Koh, 
but she refused. 
14 When the DC reconvened, Kay gave her defence: if SICC had 
asked her for a marriage certificate in 1992, she and Ng would just have 
registered their marriage there and then. Further, she could not recall 
much about her divorce and did not have the relevant documents. In 
that connection, the Court of Appeal pointed out that this defence was 
predicated on her understanding that she was charged with making a 
false declaration so as to enable Ng to use SICC’s facilities, and that the 
declaration was false because she had produced a marriage certificate 
dated 24 August 2005.30 In any event, while the DC was unable to 
confirm if the customary marriage was recognised by Singapore law, it 
ascertained that Kay was already divorced when she applied to join SICC 
and recommended the charge to be withdrawn.31 The DC’s 
recommendations were somehow leaked to Lee, and before the GC 
convened to discuss them, Lee sent an elaborate e-mail to the President 
of SICC explaining why Kay’s marriage to Ng was void under the 
Women’s Charter. The President forwarded the e-mail to the GC 
members. 
15 The GC met in April 2006. However, the Chairman of the DC 
cum member of the GC (who had disqualified himself from Kay’s DC 
hearings) wrongly informed the GC the DC was satisfied that the 
marriage between Kay and Ng was valid.32 The GC thus disagreed with 
the DC’s recommendations. It requested that the DC redeliberate, on 
the basis that Kay was not Ng’s spouse because her first marriage had 
not been dissolved before she married Ng. The GC also advised the DC 
to consider any relevant mitigating factors in their deliberations, which 
the Court of Appeal noted as the GC pre-judging Kay’s guilt.33 Kay was 
                                                                       
29 The DC assured Kay that they would not conclude its hearing without giving her a 
right to be heard first: Kay Swee Pin v Singapore Island Country Club [2007] SGHC 
166 at [14]. 
30 Kay Swee Pin [2008] 2 SLR 802 at [27]. 
31 Kay had submitted a letter from Malaysian solicitors opining that her marriage to 
Ng was deemed registered under Malaysian law, as well as four statutory 
declarations confirming the customary marriage had taken place: Kay Swee Pin 
[2007] SGHC 166 at [16]. 
32 Kay Swee Pin [2008] 2 SLR 802 at [30]. 
33 Kay Swee Pin [2008] 2 SLR 802 at [34]. 
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not asked to attend the redeliberation, but while the DC reiterated its 
view to the GC that Kay had no intention to cheat SICC and 
recommended she pay green fees for the times Ng had played golf at 
SICC, it nevertheless submitted in its second set of recommendations a 
list of “mitigating factors”. The GC – in a session dominated by the Vice-
President’s strong criticisms of the DC – considered the second report, 
and imposed an additional one-year suspension of Kay’s membership. 
16 Kay sought judicial review. She argued, inter alia, that: (a) the 
GC had acted ultra vires by rejecting the DC’s first recommendation; 
and (b) the GC had breached natural justice in convicting her without 
giving her an opportunity to be heard before them. The High Court 
Judge dismissed her claim, stating at [30], [36] and [39] of his 
judgment: 
In matters relating to disciplinary tribunals of clubs which are 
essentially social in nature, such as SICC, the court does not sit on 
appeal from their decisions. The court’s role is to ensure that the rules of 
natural justice have been complied with and that the disciplinary 
procedure set out in the club’s rules have been observed … 
… 
As is evident from the [SICC rules], the role of the DC is to hear 
evidence relating to any charge referred to it by the GC. It then 
submits its report containing its findings and recommendations to the 
GC. The recommendations need not be accepted by the GC. In its first 
report, the DC noted that it was unable to confirm whether Singapore 
law recognized the 1982 customary marriage as the plaintiff ’s divorce 
was finalised only in 1984. This legal question was dealt with by the 
GC which then asked the DC to deliberate on the basis that the 1982 
marriage could not have been a valid one. The GC was entitled to do 
this as it was to be the final decision-maker in disciplinary matters of 
the club. It should be noted that the GC here was not directing the DC 
on what factual findings to make but was merely addressing the legal 
poser. 
… 
The next contention involves the plaintiff ’s complaint that she was not 
given the right to be heard by the GC before it convicted her on the 
charge… the plaintiff appeared to be suggesting that she should have 
been heard by the DC for the second time when it made its further 
deliberations. The sequence of events… shows that the plaintiff was 
indeed heard fully and fairly by the DC as provided in the disciplinary 
scheme in Rule 34(a). Indeed, the DC even took into account her 
correspondence on the matter. In its further deliberations leading to 
the second report, the DC did not receive further evidence 
necessitating a response from the plaintiff. All that transpired between 
the two reports was the clarification on the meaning of “spouse” by 
the GC and even that issue was fully canvassed already by the plaintiff 
… [emphasis added] 
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17 Kay appealed on a number of grounds, but of particular interest 
to us were: (a) the GC was wrong to direct the DC’s decision-making; 
and (b) that there were breaches of natural justice because, inter alia, 
Kay was not given an opportunity to respond to Lee’s e-mail, the DC 
failed to hear Kay at its second meeting, and the DC Chairman ought 
not to have participated in the deliberations of the GC. 
18 The Court of Appeal agreed that the GC had failed to act fairly 
and Kay’s appeal was allowed, but in the authors’ view, the heart of the 
matter lies in the fact that the Court of Appeal prefaced its grounds of 
decision as follows:34 
The legal relationship between any club and its members lies in 
contract, and the rights of members are determined by the terms of 
the contract, which are found in the constitution or the rules of the 
club. The traditional approach of the courts to social clubs is to leave such 
clubs to manage their own affairs. However, where a club expels a 
member, it may only do so in compliance with the rules of natural justice 
… 
Before us, counsel for SICC contended that in accordance with 
established principles, this court should not interfere with the decision 
of the [GC] to suspend the appellant from membership of the Club so 
long as the GC had observed the rules of natural justice. He contended 
that the courts had no power to determine whether the GC’s decision 
was fair or whether the GC had come to a wrong conclusion on the 
facts. The GC was not sitting in judgment over matters of a trade or 
profession affecting an individual’s economic or property rights. What 
was at issue here, he pointed out, was merely the temporary cessation 
of the enjoyment of the privileges of a social club. He contended that 
the GC had not breached any of the rules of natural justice … 
We, however, pointed out to counsel that this case did not involve simply 
the suspension of a member from the Club. It was pertinent that 
membership of the Club was transferable. Membership of SICC is highly 
sought after for its social cachet as well as for the recreational, social 
and sports facilities (especially golf facilities) which the Club offers. 
Membership of SICC is regarded as a symbol of social success by 
many. For these reasons, membership of SICC comes at a high price 
… 
… 
In the present case, a more rigorous application of the rules of natural 
justice is called for as the rules of the Club (“the Rules”) confer on the GC 
very general and extensive disciplinary powers over the Club’s members 
… [emphasis added] 
19 What do we make of the different outcomes that the High 
Court and Court of Appeal came to? Was it because the former applied 
                                                                       
34 Kay Swee Pin [2008] 2 SLR 802 at [2]–[4] and [10]. 
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the rules of natural justice less rigorously? Or was it because it had not 
been brought to the full attention of certain incriminating (vis-à-vis 
SICC) facts that would have made it obvious natural justice was 
compromised? It is more likely the latter on a perusal of both 
judgments. But first and foremost, it would seem that the Court of 
Appeal had deemed it necessary to distinguish two cases the High Court 
had cited,35 viz, Lee v Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain36 and Haron bin 
Mundir v Singapore Amateur Athletic Association.37 In the former, Lord 
Justice Denning had stated at p 1181:38 
In the case of social clubs the rules usually empower the committee to 
expel a member who, in their opinion, has been guilty of conduct 
detrimental to the club, and this is a matter of opinion and nothing 
else. The courts have no wish to sit on appeal from their decisions on 
such a matter any more than from the decisions of a family conference 
… On any expulsion they will see that there is fair play … that the 
man has notice of the charge and a reasonable opportunity of being 
heard … that the committee observe the procedure laid down by the 
rules, but will not otherwise interfere. [emphasis added] 
20 And, in the latter case, it quoted from English authorities 
(at [58]): 
The jurisdiction of the courts in reviewing the decisions of domestic 
tribunals is clearly of a limited nature. The decision of such a tribunal 
cannot be attacked on the ground that it is against the weight of 
evidence. The function of the courts is to see that the rules of natural 
justice have been observed, and that the decision has been honestly 
arrived at …: 
The court has no right to sit as a court of appeal from the 
decision of the members of a club duly assembled and acting 
according to the rules, provided that in arriving at that 
decision the principles of natural justice were observed, eg, 
where a member had been expelled from the club under a 
rule providing for the expulsion of a member guilty of 
conduct injurious to the character and interests of the club, 
that the member in question had been given proper notice of 
the meeting and an opportunity to attend it and be heard, 
and that the charges had been made against him, and the 
proceedings conducted, bona fide, fairly, and in the honest 
exercise of the powers given to the meeting by the club. These 
conditions having been fulfilled, the court has no right to 
                                                                       
35 Kay Swee Pin [2007] SGHC 166 at [30]. 
36 [1952] 1 All ER 1175. 
37 [1994] 1 SLR 47. 
38 This passage has also been cited extensively in (at least) Canada: eg, Barrie v Royal 
Colwood Golf Club 2001 CarswellBC 1814 at [62]; and Lee v Lee’s Benevolent Assn of 
Canada 2007 CarswellBC 1274 at [39]. 
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consider whether or not what was done by the meeting was 
right or whether or not what was decided was reasonable. 
[emphasis added] 
21 In both cases (of considerable vintage no less), the approach 
regarding reviewing the decisions of social clubs can be distilled as 
follows: (a) the court would not review the merits of the case; (b) rather, 
the court would first ensure that the club’s decision conformed to the 
club’s rules;39 and (c) the court would ensure the principles of natural 
justice have been observed. Seen in that light, there was nothing wrong 
with the High Court relying on those two cases, unless it can be said that 
those two cases posited that the rules of natural justice are to be applied 
less rigorously in social club settings – which the authors think they did 
not. Moreover, since the rule that the reviewing court will not without 
exceptional circumstances encroach into the merits of the lower 
tribunal’s decision remains40 (as is also acknowledged in part in Kay 
Swee Pin, but cf [8] of the decision), to suggest that the enforcement of 
(b) can differ in rigour displaces Ridge v Baldwin. In fact, it renders the 
threshold question redundant. This is because if we apply our minds to 
the thought process, Ridge v Baldwin has already considered what is at 
stake in determining what categories of cases the rules of natural justice 
should apply in, viz, whether there is a deprivation of membership, 
property and economic rights, etc. Once Ridge v Baldwin applies – 
dispensing for the moment with the counter-argument that Ridge v 
Baldwin is no longer good law – the authors are of the view that there is 
no room for degree of rigour in its enforcement, as that simply militates 
against the concept of fairness and is not a defensible point of view to 
adopt. Otherwise, supposing the appellant in Kay Swee Pin was not a 
member of SICC but of a much less prestigious social club (ie, less is at 
stake), would our conclusion be, on the same factual matrix, that there 
was no breach of natural justice? That cannot be right, unless the 
concept that the rules of natural justice can be enforced less rigorously is 
accepted – and this is assuming it can be envisaged what varying degrees 
of rigour enforcement can entail to begin with. 
22 The allusions in Kay Swee Pin to the great socio-economic value 
of SICC membership and the nature and extent of the powers the GC 
possessed were, therefore, possibly misleading. Furthermore, on the facts 
presented (at least, before the Court of Appeal), it is clear the GC had 
stepped outside its station in the fact-finding, pre-judged Kay’s guilt, 
ignored her defences, mischaracterised the charge levelled against her, 
                                                                       
39 In this connection, see also Re GKN Bolts and Nuts Ltd Sports and Social Club 
[1982] 1 WLR 774 at 776 where Megarry VC remarked that in club cases, the court 
usually has to adopt a “broad sword” approach in examining the club’s rules vis-à-
vis its members. 
40 See, for example, Ho Paul [2008] 2 SLR 780 at [9]. 
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and misunderstood (the DC Chairman’s role in this respect 
notwithstanding) the DC’s findings. The whole litany of patent 
procedural defects are clothed with the antithesis of a fair hearing, and 
did not emerge apparent only because natural justice was enforced with 
greater rigour or because SICC was in a position or had the extra 
resources to facilitate a fair hearing. The Court of Appeal had, in fact, 
relied no more than on well-established first principles in concluding 
that the appellant was justifiably aggrieved:41 
A duty to act fairly involves a duty to act impartially. Procedural 
fairness requires that the decision-maker should not be biased or 
prejudiced in a way that precludes a genuine and fair consideration 
being given to the arguments or evidence presented by the parties: 
Halsbury’s at para 10.050. It is also a cardinal principle of natural 
justice that no man shall be condemned unheard. Compliance with 
the audi alteram partem rule requires that the party liable to be 
directly affected by the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings 
should be given notice of the allegation against him and should be 
given a fair opportunity to be heard. Notice includes notice of any 
evidence put before the tribunal. It is a breach of natural justice for 
evidence to be received behind the back of the party concerned: 
Halsbury’s at para 10.060. It will generally be a denial of justice to fail 
to disclose to that party specific material relevant to the decision if he 
is thereby deprived of an opportunity to comment on such material. 
Similarly, if a tribunal, after the close of the hearing, comes into 
possession of further evidence, the party affected should be invited to 
comment upon it: see Halsbury’s at para 10.061. 
23 Indeed, the said procedural defects in Kay Swee Pin represented 
instances of breaches of natural justice simply because they would have 
violated any commonsensical notion and/or fundamental tenet of a fair 
hearing (ie, first principles). It is submitted that such reliance on 
“common sense” is not as arbitrary or unhelpful as it seems, for as was 
once observed astutely: “There is no precise definition of [natural 
justice], which relies upon what a reasonable man instinctively regards 
as being just and fair.”42 Combined with the surrounding facts of the 
case (Lee’s seemingly successful politicking for his wife in particular), it 
became even clearer that Kay was not accorded a fair hearing.43 In the 
final analysis, natural justice may (arguably) have indeterminate 
content, but there should be no room for the degree of enforcement. 
                                                                       
41 Kay Swee Pin [2008] 2 SLR 802 at [7]. See also [6] and [8] of the decision. 
42 Haron bin Mundir v Singapore Amateur Athletics Association [1992] 1 SLR 18 
at [28]. 
43 See also Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 
374 at 114 where the House of Lords held that some of the factors that determine 
whether the duty to act fairly had been breached would include “the nature of the 
decision and the relationship of those involved on either side before the decision 
was taken”. 
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IV. Concluding remarks 
24 To conclude, the approach suggested here might be slightly 
tentative as well. Primarily, it is not clear if the four categories identified 
in Ridge v Baldwin are exhaustive, have become outdated, or even 
represents the local position (insofar as accepting all the four categories 
as conclusive is concerned). But that (the categories) can be remedied 
incrementally, provided we are willing to dispense with the rather 
confusing and uncertain notion that the rules of natural justice can at 
times be enforced with less rigour, a notion which takes us a step 
forward but two steps backward. Ironically, whereas Dr Ho had asked 
the court to apply the rules of natural justice with greater rigour and 
was turned down flatly, the court was happy to do so for Kay when the 
correctness of its decision would have stood without needing to be 
vindicated by a call for greater rigour. 
 
